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The Doctrine of Inventorship: Its
Ramifications in Patent Law
T HE ORIGINAL AUTHORITY for patent law and inventorship in the
United States is found in article I of the Constitution which
states that: "The Congress shall have Power ...To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries."' Under this basic authority, Congress has
enacted a number of statutes on patent law, the most recent of which
is the Patent Act of 1952.2 Like its predecessors,3 this act requires
that an application for a patent "shall be made by the inventor."4
The doctrine of inventorship has evolved from this and other related
provisions of the act.
The traditional inventors were usually individuals like Thomas
Edison, who alone had 1039 patents issued to him.5 Today, the
modern corporation with its vast research facilities has caused sub-
stantive changes in inventorship entities. It is estimated that more
than half of the living inventors are employed as researchers in the
corporation.6 Furthermore, because of the "research team" approach
employed by corporations, an increasing number of new inventions
are developed not through the work of individuals, but rather
through team efforts.' A vivid example of this type of joint in-
ventorship is a recent patent on a computer which issued to a re-
search team of twenty-one inventors.'
It is not difficult to imagine the present and potential problems
with respect to the doctrine of inventorship. The requirement that
the true inventor must apply for the patent has at times destroyed an
1 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
235 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964).
3 See, e.g., 38 Star. 958 (1915); 46 Stat. 376 (1930).
4 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1964). See Patent Office Rules of Practice, 37 C.F.R. § 1A1
(Supp. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Rules].
5 Calvert, Iventors' Psychology, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE
AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 492 (Calvert ed. 1964).
6 Sanders, How Many Patentees, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 501, 504 (1965).
7 Siegel, On Individual and Joint Patent Production, 6 PATENT, TRADEMARK, &
COPYRIGHT J. RESEARCH & EDUcATION 241 (1962) [hereinafter cited by its new
name: IDEAl.
8 See United States Letters Patent 3,112,394 assigned to the National Cash Register
Company, Dayton, Ohio.
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otherwise valid patent.' The problem is especially acute in the cor-
porate field where the true inventor or inventors are not always
easily determined when the invention develops out of a team effort.
Difficult questions arise as to whether the inventor is the supervisor,
a research member, or the whole research team. Therefore, the pur-
pose of this Note is to examine the scope of the current inventor-
ship laws and to discuss their effect and ramifications on other areas
of the law.
I. MEANING OF INVENTORSHIP
In attempting to arrive at an adequate meaning of inventorship,
it is first mandatory to define an "invention." Many complete texts,
articles, and judicial opinions have struggled with this problem."0
One of the more recent and more practical articles on this topic was
written by Judge Rich of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals," who interpreted sections 101 through 103 of the
Patent Act,'" and concluded that an invention must be new, useful,
9 See text accompanying notes 86-97 infra.
10 See, e.g., TOULMIN, INVENTION AND THE LAW (1936); Ballard, What is Inven-
tion, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 319 (1957); Buckles, Rules for Determining What Is In-
vention, 26 FORDHAM L REV. 302 (1957). For a comprehensive listing of cases which
have dealt with the question of invention see 2 WALKER, PATENTS §§ 126-27 (2d ed.
Deller 1964).
11 Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952
Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 855 (1964).
12 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964) is entitled "Inventions patentable" and reads: "Who-
ever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1964) is entitled "Conditions for patentability; novelty, and loss of right to patent"
and reads as follows:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or pat-
ented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, be-
fore the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention; or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the
applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to
the date of the application for patent in this country on an application filed
more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United
States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented,
or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in
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and unobvious.'3 But even if these requirements are met, a patent-
able invention might not exist because of a statutory bar. 4 Section
102 contains various bars to patentability which, together with
section 103, distinguish the patentable from the unpatentable in-
vention. As Judge Rich so aptly stated:
All an invention is, however, is something which has been found
out, or devised, or discovered. The question today is not what to
call it but whether, under the statute, it is patentable. Hundreds of
"real" or "true" inventions, all resulting from "inventive acts" and
the exercise of the "inventive faculties" are held unpatentable every
day for lack of novelty.15
The second element of inventorship is the inventor. In order
for one to become a statutory inventor, he must be responsible for
the development of something which falls within the scope of the
statutory definition of an invention."8 Employing this type of cir-
cular reasoning, it seems that the "statutory inventor" must be one
who discovers something new, useful, and unobvious. Upon such
a discovery, the inventor who wants to become a patentee must
first file, in conjunction with his patent application, an oath where-
by he swears that he believes himself to be the first and true invent-
or, and that he knows of no other statutory bar which would affect
him.'" A patent which is not supported by such an oath or is other-
wise applied for by one who is not the inventor is void.'" If it should
this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed
it ....
35 U.S.C. 5 103 (1964) is entitled "Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject
matter" and reads as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
dosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.
'
8 Rich, supra note 11, at 874.
14Ibid. For a recent judicial application of the obviousness doctrine see Application
of Hostettler, 356 F.2d 562. 566 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
15 Rich, supra note 11, at 862.
16 See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
1735 U.S.C. § 115 (1964); Rules, 37 C.F.R. § 1.65 (Supp. 1966), which reads
in part as follows:
Statement of Applicant.
(a) (1) The applicant, if the inventor, must state that he verily believes
himself to be the original and first inventor or discoverer of the process, ma-
chine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for which
he solicits a patent; that he does not know and does not believe that the same
was ever known or used before his invention or discovery thereof, and shall
state of what country he is a citizen and where he resides and whether he is
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occur that two inventors file for a patent on the same invention,
priority is given to the one who first conceived the invention, pro-
vided that he has not abandoned his invention but rather proceeded
with diligence to perfect it."° Then, if there is no statutory bar, the
inventor joins a special class (approximately four out of every 1000
Americans)'m known as patentees.
As was previously indicated,2 an invention can be the product
of joint inventors: 2
In order to constitute two persons joint inventors, it is not neces-
sary that the inventive concept come to both at the same time.
Some of the features may be contributed by one and other features
by the other and where, as here, the separate contributions result in
a patentable combination the invention is joint.23
Furthermore, an oath which is executed by joint inventors is prima
fade evidence of their joint inventorship. 4 Nevertheless, the con-
cept of joint invention, being somewhat nebulous, is the subject of
much attack, especially as a defense to infringement actions. The
susceptibility of a joint patent to such attacks is seemingly the reason
a sole or joint inventor of the invention claimed in his application. In every
original application the applicant must distinctly state to the best of his knowl-
edge and belief the invention has not been in public use or on sale in the
United States more than one year prior to his application or patented or de-
scribed in any printed publication in any country before his invention or more
than one year prior to his application, or patented in any foreign country
prior to the date of his application on an application filed by himself or his
legal representatives or assigns more than twelve months prior to his applica-
tion, in this country. He shall state whether or not any application for patent
on the same invention has been filed in any foreign country, either by him-
self, or by his legal representatives or assigns ....
18 Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667 (1888); City of Milwaukee v. Activated
Sludge, Inc., 69 P.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 567 (1934). See also
statutory materials cited note 4 supra.
'1 Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 35 (1943).
20 Sanders, supra note 6, at 506.
21 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
22The statutory provision for joint inventorship is found in 35 U.S.C. 5 116
(1964), which is entitled "Joint inventors" and states in part as follows: "When an
invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly
and each sign the application and make the required oath, except as otherwise provided
in this title."
23 Moler v. Purdy, 131 U.S.P.Q. 276, 279 (Pat. Off. Bd. Int. 1960). For similar
language see, e.g., Pointer v. Six Wheel Corp., 177 F.2d 153, 157 (9th Cir. 1949);
Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 72 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir.
1934), rev'd on other grounds, 294 U.S. 477 (1935); 1 ROBINSON, PATENTs § 398
(1890).
24 Moler v. Purdy, supra note 23. Many other cases have also recognized this.
See, e.g., Carter v. Kellgren, 166 F.2d 592 (C.C.P.A. 1948); Brown v. Edler, 110 F.2d
858 (C.C.P.A. 1940); Beidler v. Caps, 36 F.2d 122 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
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that the courts require a high degree of proof to sustain them.25
The statute, however, provides for certain exceptions to the rigid
requirement that the true inventor must apply for a patent. If the
inventor has died or become mentally incompetent, his legal repre-
sentative or guardian may apply.2" Also, the statute supplies a
remedy if either a joint or sole inventor refuses to apply or is missing
and cannot be located after a reasonably diligent search." While
the utilization of these provisions has not been extensive, it has been
urged that great effort should be made to locate missing inventors
due to the relative hardship on the Patent Office in verifying appli-
cations of this nature.28
II. INVENTORSHIP IN THE CORPORATION
A patent or patent application has the attributes of personal
property and is thus freely assignable.29 Furthermore, patents may
issue to the assignee of an inventor, as long as the patent is applied
for and issued in the name of the inventor." Because of this liberal
provision, corporations today own, by way of assignment, a majority
of the active patents.3 Most major corporations and some smaller
ones obtain these assignments by requiring each employee involved
in research and development to sign an invention assignment con-
tract. 2 In such a case, the corporation would be the ultimate owner
of the resulting patent; and this would occur regardless of the iden-
tity of the true inventor." But it is not the ultimate ownership of
the invention which is of primary concern with respect to obtaining
a valid patent; rather, it is the identity of the inventor which is of
central importance.
25E.g., Klein v. American Casting & Mfg. Corp., 87 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1937); Hol-
stensson v. Webcor, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1957); DeLaski & Thropp Cir-
cular Woven Tire Co. v. William R. Thropp & Sons Co., 218 Fed. 458 (D.N.J. 1914),
aff'd, 226 Fed. 941 (3d Cir. 1915); Carter v. Kellgren, supra note 24.
2635 U.S.C. 5 117 (1964); Rules, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.42-.43 (Supp. 1966).
2735 U.S.C. 5 116, 118 (1964); Rules, 37 C.F.R. § 1.47 (Supp. 1966).
2 8 Tomkins, Filing Patent Application by Other Than the Inventor, 40 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 668 (1958).
2935 U.S.C. § 261 (1964); ELLIS, PATENT AssiGNMENTs 5 1 (3d ed. 1955).
30 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
31 See Federico, Distribution of Patents Issued to Corporations (1939-55), 39 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 405 (1957).
32 Student Paper, 7 IDEA 380 (1963).
33 It should be pointed out that the assignor-employee is always entitled to have his
name appear on the patent as the inventor. This is all-important to him.
First and foremost, don't ever lose sight of the fact that a United States patent
is issued in the inventor's name, and although he assigns the rights to his
company, his name will forever be attached to that patent. This is his indis-
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The problems which might arise with respect to corporate inven-
torship can be best demonstrated by first posing a hypothetical fact
situation, then looking at the applicable case law, and finally apply-
ing that law to the original hypothetical situation."' In a hypotheti-
cal corporation, assume that a chief engineer (A) calls into his office
a supervisor (B) who is the overseer of a team of researchers (C, D,
and B). During their conference A tells B to attempt to develop a
certain improvement on a machine and suggests a general method or
approach. B delegates this duty to his team, relating A's sugges-
tions and adding a few of his own. While C does most of the work
on this project, he is in constant contact with B. B, in turn, keeps A
well informed, and both A and B offer some other suggestions to
the team. During many months of research, D and E have both
aided C in small but important aspects of the project. Finally, the
research culminates in a patentable invention. The question for
putable claim to being an accomplished inventor, and no one - no company
- can take this away from him. The more patents that bear his name, re-
gardless of what he did with the rights to them, the greater is his standing in
the technological community. Issued patents are tangible evidence of his
worth as an inventor, and they are perfectly salable in his quest for a job
wherever he goes. They will have an effect on his salary. Barnes, The Pat-
ent System From an Inventor's Point Of View, 5 IDEA 64, 68 (1961).
In fact, a recent New Jersey case, Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Super.
1, 198 A.2d 791 (1964), has held "that a wrongful deprivation of that credit [her
name on the patentjby publishing the formula and process in a patent as the invention
of another would constitute an actionable tort." Id. at 14, 198 A.2d at 797. (Empha-
asis added.) From the result of this decision, it would appear that the employer who
does not apply for a patent in the name of the true inventor stands to lose in two re-
spects. First, the patent can be invalidated (See text accompanying notes 86-97 infra)
and second, damages may be assessed for the denial of intellectual credit to the inventor.
However, in the absence of the typical assignment agreement, it can generally be
said that the invention belongs to the inventing employee. The employer is only en-
titled to a non-transferable "shop right," that is, an irrevocable royalty-free license to
use the item. Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 76 F. Supp. 378 (D. Del. 1948),
affld, 175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1949). For a general discussion of the doctrine of shop
rights see COSTA, LAW OF INVENTING IN EMPLOYMNT 9-37 (1953); Student Paper,
7 IDEA 380 (1963). This general rule is subject to the exception that if the employee
was hired for the specific purpose, i.e., to invent, then there is an implied assignment
to the employer. Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890). There the em-
ployer was the government. Two other key cases which demonstrate that the govern-
ment is subject to much the same rules as any other employer are United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933), and Houghton v. United States, 23
F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), crt. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928). For a general discussion of
these cases see Finnegan & Pogue, Federal Employee Invention Rights - Time to Leg.
islate, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 252 (1958).
341Tis problem is not intended to be exclusive of other problems which could arise
with respect to inventorship entities within the corporation. Rather, this factual situa-
tion is used only as a basis for the substantive material which follows. An example of
an ancillary problem is the all too frequent situation where the smaller corporation
merely applies for the patent in the name of its president no matter who the inventor.
This poor policy is probably due to possible assignment conflicts within the corpora-
tion. Nothing but trouble can stem from this corporate practice.
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purposes of obtaining a patent is who is the "true inventor"? Is it
A; B; B and C; C, D and E; or all five?
Any analysis involving the employer-inventing employee rela-
tionship should include the basic case of Agawam Co. v. Jordan."5
There, the following principle was set forth:
[Wlhere a person has discovered an improved principle . . .
and employs other persons to assist him in carrying out that prin-
ciple, and they, in the course of experiments arising from that em-
ployment, make valuable discoveries ancillary to the plan and
preconceived design of the employer, such suggested improve-
ments are in general to be regarded as the property of the party
who discovered the original improved principle, and may be em-
bodied in his patent as a part of his invention. . . . Persons
employed, as much as employers, are entitled to their own inde-
pendent inventions, but where the employer has conceived the
plan of an invention and is engaged in experiments to perfect it,
no suggestions from an employee, not amounting to a new method
or arrangement which, in itself is a complete invention, is suffi-
cient to deprive the employer of the exc usive property in the
perfected improvementa 6
The Supreme Court, relying on Agawam, may have extended this
general rule in the case of Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde.87
There, even though an assisting employee observed a desired result
from his experimentation and recognized its inventive advantages,
the court held that the resulting invention was the employers'. The
employee was nothing more than a mechanical puppet under the
direction of the employers who themselves were the stimulus for the
invention."8
Seemingly at variance with these cases, however, is a 1959 dis-
trict court decision, 9 where the court implied, under a factual situa-
tion which parallels the Agawam case, that a joint inventorship
entity would have been acceptable.40 In this case, the assistant was
helping the supervisor in the construction of a certain apparatus.
After more than a year's work, the project was completed. Subse-
quently and without any warning, the assistant procured a patent on
the invention. In holding the patent invalid, the court said that at
best the patent should have issued to both the supervisor and assist-
2574 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583 (1868).
861d. at 602-03. For a critical discussion of this case see Prager, Agawam v. Jor-
dan, Annotated, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 737 (1940).
a7 2 42 U.S. 261 (1916).
881d. at 270.
29 Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Ruth, 179 F. Supp. 906 (D. Colo. 1959).
40Id. at 911.
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ant as joint inventors.4 This statement, if nothing more, is a re-
laxation of the Agawam rule.
If the employer merely suggests a desired result to the employee
and the employee's labor culminates in a patentable invention, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has said that the employee is the
inventor.42 In that case the employee was instructed to build a cer-
tain machine which would perform like a present model, only he was
to do it without wires. Holding that this was merely asking for a
result, similar to asking the Wright brothers to build something that
would fly, the court held that the "employer who seeks to patent the
fruits of his employees' labors must go further than merely to ex-
press a purpose to be realized."4  The court then attempted to de-
fine a point at which the employer would disclose enough of his own
ingenuity to claim the invention for himself. It indicated that this
point would be reached when a reasonable degree of inventive certi-
tude is disclosed so that one skilled in the art is enabled to practice
the invention.44 Thus, more than a purpose, result, or means is
needed.
In the case of Fersing v. Fast,45 the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held that unless the employer suggests the broad idea that
results in the invention, his status as an employer does not entitle
him to be considered the inventor. It is hard to determine the legal
distinction between the purpose, result, or means criterion used by
the Second Circuit, and the broad idea concept of the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals. Surely the broad idea must be more
than a mere purpose, result, or means, but where the line is drawn is
not dear. Possibly one answer lies in the significance the Fersing
court placed on the fact that the employees inventive background
demonstrated that he was more likely to be the inventor.4" Al-
though other courts have also used this criterion,4'7 it is questionable
whether this is consistent with the purpose of the patent statutes.4"
4 IbiI.
42 International Carrier-Call & Television Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 142 F.2d
493 (2d Cir. 1944).
4
s Id. at 496.
44 Ibid.
45 121 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1941).
46 Id. at 537.
4 7 See generally .arson v. Crowther, 1 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cit. 1924), cert. denied,
267 U.S. 593 (1925), where an invention was more logically conceived by a trained
bacteriologist than a mechanic.
48 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1964) requires that the patent be applied for by the inventor.
The obvious purpose is to protect the inventor and to recognize credit due and owing him.
Should the courts be allowed to decide cases on such weak points as education or ex-
1966] 1349
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1342
The one factor upon which the courts will all agree is that the bur-
den of proof of first and sole inventorship will always lie with the
employee.4' This conclusion is self-evident when one considers the
master-servant basis upon which it lies.
The difficulty in applying these cases to the hypothetical factual
situation posed above is apparent. Adopting the Agawam reason-
ing," the inventorship would depend on the scope of A's and B's
ideas and suggestions. If the bulk of the inventive work rested with
the research team, then C would be the inventor, with the possibility
of co-inventorship with D and E. Although the facts in the hypo-
thetical situation are insufficient to make a definite determination,
it would appear that A merely suggested a purpose or a result to be
carried out." Since the purpose or result would probably not fall
into the broad idea classification set out by the Fersing court,52 it
seems that A could not be considered a co-inventor. In light of the
definition of joint inventorship," B and C may well be the true in-
ventors in this case. However, if D's and Es suggestions played a
major role in the inventive concept, they too should be included.
Also if B's ideas added nothing or if C were a mere mechanical pup-
pet, then one or both of these men would be disqualified. Each case
must be decided on its own particular facts:
The real question is whether or not the improvements suggested
by the workman were of such a serious and important character as
to preclude their adoption by the inventor as part of his invention.
It would be difficult to define how far the suggestions of a work-
man employed in the construction of a machine are to be con-
sidered as distinct inventions by him, so as to avoid a patent
incorporating them, and taken out by his employer. Each case must
depend on its own merits. But, when it is seen that the principal
and object of an invention are complete without the suggestion,
it is too much that the workman's suggestion should render the
whole patent void even though the suggestion was of something
calculated more easily to carry into effect the concept of the in-
ventor.54
perience in the field? While this is not often the sole basis of the decisions, the fact
that it is even considered is not consistent with the absolute manner which § 111 has
been interpreted.
49 E.g., Larson v. Crowther, 1 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cit. 1924), cert. deaied, 267 U.S.
593 (1925), where the employee had the burden of proof even though he was the sen-
ior party in an interference proceeding; Riehm v. Hambleton, 53 F. Supp. 328 (D.
Mass. 1943).
50 Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583 (1868).
51 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
5-See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
53 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
54 1 WALKER, op. cit. supra note 10, § 44, at 190-91. (Emphasis added.)
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Although statistics show that a majority of the patents are is-
sued to sole inventors,55 at least one authority has suggested that
corporations ought to employ the joint inventorship doctrine more
frequently in cases of doubt.5" This would not only protect the em-
ployer but would also enhance the position of the employee who
was the "doubtful" inventor. The only employee who could pos-
sibly be hurt by this method of inventorship selection would be the
employee who actually was a sole inventor.57 The employer would
rarely be hurt because of the liberal rules for correcting erroneous
inventorship entities.58
It is very possible that this "more-the-safer" attitude toward in-
ventorship is the trend in many corporations today. Whether this is
consistent with the statutory requirement that the true inventor must
apply has not been decided.5" Nevertheless, this trend has and will
cause some difficulty where the wrong inventorship entity is placed
on an application or patent.
IIl. CONVERSION OF INVENTORSHIPS AND PRIORITY PROBLEMS
The problem of the identity of the true inventor is often a con-
fusing one. In fact, it is so confusing that many times a true invent-
or is omitted from the application or a non-inventor is inadvertently
added. As was previously mentioned, this could easily arise within
the corporation. Prior to the Patent Act of 195260 there was no
statutory authority for changing inventorship entities. Now, how-
ever, sections 116 and 256 of the act,6 respectively, allow for the
55 See Siegel, On Individual and joint Patent Production, 6 IDEA 241 (1962).
56 CosTA, op. cit. supra note 33, at 67.
57 Id. at 68.
58 See text accompanying notes 60-85 infra.
59 It is submitted here, as similarly in note 48 supra, that the "more-the-safer" ap-
proach is not in keeping with the purpose of § 111. Certainly the drafters of the stat-
ute did not expect an application to bear five names simply for the purpose of making
sure that the inventor was somewhere included, that is, possibly one of the five. The
statute would require, however, that all five applicants be joint inventors.
60 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964).
6135 U.S.C. § 116 (1964), which states in part as follows:
Whenever a person is joined in an application for patent as joint inventor
through error, or a joint inventor is not included in an application through
error, and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the
Commissioner may permit the application to be amended accordingly, under
such terms as he prescribes.
35 U.S.C. § 256 (1964), entitled "Misjoinder of Inventor" reads as follows:
Whenever a patent is issued on the application of persons as joint inven-
tors and it appears that one of such persons was not in fact a joint inventor,
and that he was included as a joint inventor by error and without any decep-
tive intention, the Commissioner may, on application of all the parties and
1966] 1351
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correction of misjoinder or nonjoinder while the application is pend-
ing and after it issues. The misjoinder or nonjoinder, however, must
have arisen "through error" and "without any deceptive intention."
The only real risk in changing inventorship is that of losing the
earlier filing date established by the original application. Section
1202 stipulates that in order to secure the original filing date, the
two applications must be "by the same inventor." Therefore in the
typical case, the courts are confronted with the two-fold question of
what is "error without any deceptive intention" and who is the
"same inventor"?
A. Error Without Any Deceptive Intention
In order to adequately understand the basis of the post-1952 de-
cisions, it is necessary to look at the judicial background of the
statute. Prior to the Patent Act, the courts had determined that in-
ventorship corrections could be made by way of amendment or by
filing a continuation" or a continuation-in-part" application. In
the case of In re Roberts,5 the applicants originally applied as joint
assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be im-
posed, issue a certificate deleting the name of the erroneously joined person
from the patent.
Whenever a patent is issued and it appears that a person was a joint in-
ventor, but was omitted by error and without deceptive intention on his part,
the Commissioner may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with
proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issue a cer-
tificate adding his name to the patent as a joint inventor.
The misjoinder or nonjoinder of joint inventors shall not invalidate a
patent, if such error can be corrected as provided in this section.
See also Rules, 37 C.F.R. § 1.45 (Supp. 1966).
02 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1964), entitled "Benefit of earlier filing date in the United
States" reads:
An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner pro-
vided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application pre-
viously filed in the United States by the same inventor shall have the same
effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior applica-
tion, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of pro-
ceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to
the benefit of the filing date of the first application and if it contains or is
amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application.
63 In re Roberts, 263 Fed. 646 (D.C. Cir. 1920). "A continuation is a second ap-
plication for the same invention claimed in a proper application and filed before the
original becomes abandoned." U.S. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDUR.
§ 201.07 (7th rev. 1966).
6 Application of Strain, 187 F.2d 737 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Perrin, 142 F.2d
277 (C.C.P.A. 1944). "A continuation-in-part is an application filed during the life-
time of an earlier application by the same applicant, repeating some substantial portion
or all of the earlier application and adding matter not disclosed in the said earlier case."
U.S. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.08 (7th rev. 1966).
65 263 Fed. 646 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
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inventors. During the pendency of their application, one of the ap-
plicants admitted that he had no part in the invention. With ade-
quate proof that this was mere inadvertence without fraudulent
intent, the court allowed the true inventor to file a continuation ap-
plication in which he received the benefit of the filing date of the
previous joint invention.6" But in Ex parte Benes,6" the Commis-
sioner would not allow the reverse to apply. That is, the Benes case
held that the sole applicant could not amend his application to in-
dude another co-inventor.68 Sections 116 and 256 of the 1952
act6" have in effect codified the Roberts decision, but have changed
the result of Benes. As previously noted, however, the enactment
of these sections has caused a semantic problem for the courts."
In John Blue Co. v. Dempster Mill Mfg. Co.," a case interpret-
ing the new sections 116 and 256, attorneys for the plaintiff had
prepared an application in the names of the two joint inventors.
The general manager of the company, however, removed one of the
names from the patent application, and filed it as a sole invention.
Relying on the interpretation of similar language in another section
of the statute,"2 the court held that "error" and "bona fide mistake"
are synonymous. The deliberate act of striking one of the names of
an inventorship entity was not "error" in this light."
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was confronted with
a similar problem in Application of Schmidt."' In that case the in-
ventor first filed a sole application. He later abandoned this appli-
cation after reapplying for the same subject matter with five co-
inventors. Finally he applied a third time, again as a sole inventor,
66 Id. at 648-49.
67 1925 Dec. Com. Pat. 75.
68 Id. at 76.
69 See statutes quoted note 61 supra.
70 The courts are now faced with the statutory interpretation of the wording "error
without any deceptive intention" and "the same inventor" as found in sections 116, 120,
and 256.
"'172 F. Supp. 23 (D. Neb. 1958), aff'd, 275 P.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1960).
72 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1964) allows for the reissue of a patent using the same word-
ing: "error without any deceptive intention." In John Blue, the court could not find
any prior interpretations of section 256 so it relied on past interpretations of section
251 which has the above similar language. One case relied on was Riley v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, 114 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Cal. 1953), aft'd, 217 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1954),
where a deliberate move on the part of counsel was held not to be error under section
251. A later case, Ex parte Johnson, 117 U.S.P.Q. 412 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1956),
has held that section 251 will not allow a patent to reissue for misjoinder of invention.
73 John Blue Co. v. Dempster Mill Mfg. Co., 172 F. Supp. 23, 30-31 (D. Neb.
1958), afI'd, 275 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1960).
"4 293 F.2d 274 (C.CP.A. 1961).
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the joint application being cancelled. Appellant, the inventor, was
seeking to retain the filing date of his first application alleging inad-
vertence and mistake with respect to the filing of the intermediate
joint application. The court held that the "error" which occurred in
filing the joint application was of the type for which section 116 had
been constructed:
It is, we believe, the correct interpretation of congressional intent
that the expression "error... without any deceptive intention" in
section 116 was intended not only to replace the more cumbersome
expression "inadvertence, accident or mistake" previously used [in
cases like In re Roberts75] but was intended to relieve applicants
from the narrow application of the old terms as the courts had
construed them.76
B. The Same Inventor
Still another contention of the appellant in the Schmidt case was
that all three applications were, in effect, filed by the "same inven-
tor." The court thus found it mandatory to interpret that term as
used in section 120:"7
It ["same inventor"] must be construed with all other relevant
sections of the statute, including sections 116 and 256 and thus it
embraces the possibility permitted by sections 116 and 256 that
the earlier application may be corrected thereunder by changes in
the name or names of the applicants under the conditions stated in
section 116.
We hold therefore that appellant was entitled under section
116 to correct the errors in the intermediate application filed in
the names of joint inventors and under section 120 was entitled as
"the same inventor" to the benefits of the filing dates of the
earlier co-pending applications.78
Another case which attempts to interpret the concept of "same
inventor" is Ex parte Kugler."9 There, co-inventors, A, B, and C,
had filed a joint application. They decided to divide their applica-
tion under section 12180 into three individual inventions. A now
wanted to use the filing date of the original joint application, alleg-
75263 Fed. 646 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
76 Application of Schmidt, 293 F.2d 274, 279 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Schmidt is cited
favorably in Patterson v. Hauck, 341 F.2d 131, 138 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
77 Application of Schmidt, supra note 76. See statute quoted note 62 supra.
78 Application of Schmidt, 293 F.2d 274, 279 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
79 143 U.S.P.Q. 70 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1963).
80 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1964) sets out the procedure to be followed in divisional ap-
plications. In the U.S. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROcEDURE § 201.06 (7th
rev. 1966), a divisional application is defined as "a later application for a distant
or independent invention, carved out of a pending application and disclosing and claim-
ing nothing not disclosed in the earlier or parent application ...."
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ing that he was "the same inventor" as one of the inventors who
filed the original application. The court accepted this argument
even though A would have been able to employ an alternative pro-
cedure for securing the earlier filing date.81
Despite the logic employed in the Schmidt and Kugler line of
decisions, which holds that A is in effect the "same inventor" as
A and B in cases of error, many courts have labeled these inventor-
ships as different entities. In Ex parte Siebring,82 for example, the
board of appeals said that sole and joint applicants are separate and
distinct entities. In this case A, while applying for a patent, was
sued by B for patent infringement on the same subject matter. A's
application had been rejected with B as the sole reference. In the
process of settling the suit, A admitted that B was the sole and true
inventor. After this admission but prior to the court decree which
enjoined A from prosecuting his application, A changed his inven-
torship to that of A and a third party, C. A and C then were able to
swear behind the reference of B by way of a Rule 131 affidavite and
overcome B's priority. The court said that the injunction against A
did not apply to A and C because the two entities were not the
same.s While this holding would seem at first to be inconsistent
with the Schmidt case, the two may be reconcilable. Siebring can
be interpreted as merely upholding the equitable principle of the
injunction, because an injunction against A alone would never bind
A and others. The decree in this case was against A alone and did
not include C. Thus A and C, joined as an entity, were not bound
81REx pare Kugler, 143 U.S.P.Q. 70, 71-72 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1963). The alter-
native procedure which could have been followed "would have been to file subsequent
to the filing of the original application, and during the pendency thereof, three sole
applications, each restricted to the subject matter as in the three applications... con-
sidered herein." Id. at 72. For another case which holds that A is entitled to the pre-
vious filing date of A and B see Johnson & Johnson v. C. B. Stenvall, Inc., 193 F. Supp.
128 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The question arises as to the consistency of this rule with an-
other rule which says that the joint invention of two inventors is a good anticipation
to the later invention of either individually. See, e.g., Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v.
Greenwalt, 27 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1928).
The courts have developed still other requirements which must be met if a converted
inventorship entity is to receive benefit of a previous filing date. If the entity of A
and B were to be converted to A alone, it is mandatory that B disclaims his connection
with the invention. Merry lfg. Co. v. Burns Tool Co., 335 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1964).
Another case, Van Otteren v. Hafner, 278 F.2d 738 (C.C.P.A. 1960), has carried over
the concept of diligence to the area of conversion of inventorships, holding that correc-
tion would be denied to an applicant who did not use diligence in making the correc-
tion.
82 138 U.S.P.Q. 82 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961).
83 Rules, 37 C.R. § 1.131 (1960). This rule allows an inventor to file an af-
fidavit of prior invention to overcome a cited patent or publication against him.
84 Ex Parte Siebring, 138 U.S.P.Q. 82, 83 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961).
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by it. If this case stands for any miscarriage of justice in the area of
inventorship law, it would stem from the fact that A admitted that
B was the true inventor and then later swore that he and C were the
true inventors.
In summation it must be reemphasized that the conversion sec-
tions are quite liberal when innocent error is involved and there is no
evidence of bad faith. While the judicial decisions in this area may
not always be as liberal, it is evident that the courts will readily allow
conversions from sole to joint or joint to sole inventorship entities.
It should be recognized, however, that the statute is silent as to the
possible conversion from sole to sole. If the statute is indeed de-
signed to assure that the true inventor applies, what material justifi-
cation is there for not permitting the sole to sole conversion in
a case of innocent error? One patent authority has suggested that
this silence indicates that conversion from sole to sole cannot be
accomplished in either one or two steps.85 The only logical justifi-
cation of this interpretation is that the elementary factor - that the
true inventor has not signed the application - has not been met.
At least if A and B initially apply as co-inventors and only one is the
inventor, the correction can be made without having disturbed the
fact that at least a co-inventor originally signed the application.
Nevertheless, it seems that only this technicality prevents the con-
version of an application of one sole applicant to that of another.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF INVENTORSHIP
In view of the liberal conversion statutes, it might appear at first
blush that there would be no undesirable ramifications of the doc-
trine of inventorship. Even since 1952, however, the erroneous and
uncorrectable inventorship entity has created problems in the areas
of patent invalidity, patent interference practice, double patenting,
and antitrust law.
A. Patent Invalidity
As has been pointed out previously, it is of vital importance to
the validity of a patent that the true inventorship entity appear on
the application. Before the adoption of sections 116 and 256, it
was much more difficult, and sometimes impossible, to make any
necessary corrections in the inventorship entity in order to save the
8 5 Federico, Commentary to the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 28 (1954). Mr.
Federico is a member of the Board of Appeals of the Patent Office.
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patent Often the issue of invalidity was brought up as a defense
to an infringement action or as an argument in an interference pro-
ceeding. 6 While attacks on the patent's validity still arise under the
1952 act, section 256 allows the patentee to make the necessary cor-
rection if he can prove error. If error cannot be proven, a subse-
quent attack on the patent can still invalidate it.
Thus, in a typical pre-1952 infringement action, De Laval Sepa-
rator Co. v. Vermont Farm Mach. Co.,' the lower court's decision
holding the patent invalid was affirmed. There, the evidence
showed that the work of two inventors had been disclosed in the
specifications, but that the daims of the invention covered the work
of only one of them.8" Thus, the patent which issued to joint inven-
tors was in reality the work of a sole inventor and therefore in-
valid."9 Although the court affirmed the lower court's decision, it
displayed some reluctance in doing so because the argument of in-
validity based on an erroneous inventorship entity is purely technical
and at times can destroy a meritorious patent." Yet other courts
have been quick to invalidate a patent which was secured by an ap-
plicant who falsely swore that he was the first and true inventor. 1
Some other pre-1952 cases questioned the validity of a pat-
ent, but found that the facts showed that the true inventor had ap-
plied." However, notwithstanding pre-1952 cases which found a
valid patent despite the virtual impossibility of correction, it would
seem that the only significant change between the pre-1952 invent-
orship cases and the more recent ones is that now there are fewer
patents being invalidated. Today, before a person goes to trial with
his patent to sue for infringement, he makes certain that the invent-
orship entity is correct. If it is not, and he can allege error, he can
86 Lackey, Problems in Joint Ownership of Patents, 11 VAND. L. REv. 697 (1958).
87 135 Fed. 772 (2d Cir. 1904).
88 Every patent application must contain specifications which describe the invention
so that one skilled in the art could make or use the apparatus. The specifications
must conclude with a claim or claims which define exactly what the applicant believes
his invention to be. Rules, 37 CF.R. §§ 1.71, 1.75 (1960). -Thus much matter can
be disclosed in the specifications which is not claimed as an invention in the claims.
89 De Laval Separator Co. v. Vermont Farm Mach. Co., 135 Fed. 772 (2d Cir.
1904).
9 0 Ibid.
91 E.g., Gotz v. Universal Prods. Co., 107 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1939).
92A typical case is City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934), where the questionable patent issued to a
group of scientists. At the outset the court recognized that if the true inventor was not
named on the patent that it could not be valid. But after looking at the facts, the court
found it unnecessary to declare the patent invalid because it had been granted to the true
inventor. Id. at 587.
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change it. Before 1952, he could not have changed any erroneous
inventorships, and the patent would very likely have been declared
invalid. Nevertheless, the courts still exercise many opportunities
to invalidate patents for erroneous inventorships."
There is one further problem often encountered by the patent
application draftsman who handles many joint inventions. Remem-
bering that the claims define the invention,' it should also be re-
membered that if the inventorship is joint, then each claim must be
joint - for a patent which issues to joint inventors with claims to
a sole invention is void.95 Due to the very technical nature of the
proof in this area, the courts are seldom asked to deal with it. But
it is inconceivable that every claim of every patent of two, three,
or even up to twenty-one inventors98 could have been the joint work
of all inventors. Technically, this is required. The corporate patent
attorney should consider this before he employs the "more-the-safer"
doctrine which some authorities seem to sanction.9
B. Patent Interference Practice
An interference action is a quasi-judicial proceeding which is in-
stituted by the Patent Office in order to determine inventorship
priorities.9" In these proceedings, the burden of proof is on the
junior party, that is, the party who filed second in time, to prove his
alleged priority."  Since the proceeding determines the identity of
the true and first inventor as between two applicants, it is mandatory
that the applications state the correct inventorship entity. While
interference involves less than one per cent of all applications,'
9 3 E.g., Merry Mfg. Co. v. Burns Tool Co., 335 F.2d 239 (5th Cit. 1964); Stearns-
Roger Mfg. Co. v. Ruth, 179 F. Supp. 906 (D. Colo. 1959); 1 WALKER, PATM §
42 (2d ed. Deller 1964).
94 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1964). See also note 88 supra.
9 5 E.g., Application of Sarett, 327' F.2d 1005, 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Stewart v.
Tenk, 32 Fed. 665 (S.D. Ill. 1887).
96 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
97 See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
98 35 U.S.C. § 135 (a) (1964). For a general background in interference law see
Crews & Crews, Introduction to Interference Law and Practice, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
755 (1964).
99 E.g., Mortsell v. Laurila, 301 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Rodin v. Spalding, 297
F.2d .256 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Ligh v. Stransky, 141 U.S.P.Q. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Bomart v. Noymer, 141 U.S.P.Q. 252 (Pat. Off. Bd. Int. 1963); Lafon v. Zirm, 141
U.S.P.Q. 442 (Pat. Off. Bd. Int. 1962).
100 Epperson, Interferences, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRAcrICE AND
INVENTION MANAGEMENT 467, 468 (Calvert ed. 1964).
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probably in no other area of patent practice is the inventorship entity
put to a more stringent test.'
The recent case of Ex parte Lyon 0 2 is very much on point.
There, the interference arose out of the following set of facts: A
filed for a patent in 1954. In 1957, A and B filed for improvement
on A's invention. A's sole application was issued in July, 1958.
After getting fifteen claims allowed on their joint improvement, A
and B cancelled these claims, added nine new claims directed to sub-
ject matter not previously claimed, and requested conversion of the
application from a joint application in A and B to a sole application
in A. On the same day another application was filed by A and B
which claimed the original fifteen allowed claims of their abandoned
application. Subsequently the examiner declared the interference
with X whose patent had issued a year before. In this action A
wanted to secure the prior date of his first application in order to win
the interference against X. The sole issue was whether this was a
proper conversion, for if it were, A could claim the earlier filing
date. The applicant asserted that the conversion was proper since
the error was the disclosure of some subject matter which had not
been invented by the two applicants. The Board held that this
was not error of joinder of inventors as is necessary for compliance
with section 116."3 Since the original claims were correctly those
of the joint inventors, there was no error at the time of filing, and
there could be no error of joinder of parties.'
One dissenting member of the Board was of the opinion that the
statute does not restrict the "application for patent" to the applica-
tion as originally filed."0 5 This view is supported by Application of
Schmidt' where the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held
that the inventorship conversion from sole to joint and back to sole
was a proper case for the assertion of the prior filing date. It seems
clear in the Schmidt case that there also was "no error at the time of
filing." The obvious factual distinction between the two cases is
that in Schmidt the sole inventor's claims were there from the begin-
101 It was decided long ago that a change in inventorship entities could be made
during an interference proceeding. Crane v. Grier, 71 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
However, the converter must be diligent. Manny v. Garlick, 135 F.2d 757 (C.C.P.A.
1943).
102 146 U.S.P.Q. 222 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964).
103 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1964), quoted at note 61 supra.
104 Ex parte Lyon, 146 U.S.P.Q. 222, 224 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964).
:65 Id. at 224-25.
106293 P.2d 274 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
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ning while in Lyon they were merely added after three years of
prosecution. Yet the case of Teter v. Kearby °7 indicates that it is
immaterial that the subject matter in the continuation is claimed for
the first time. The only requirement is that the subject matter must
have been previously disclosed.
In the light of the Lyon decision, it is difficult to determine the
state of inventorship law with respect to interference practice, at
least at the Board of Appeals level. It seems quite inequitable that,
because a person joins with another to co-invent an improvement in
his original sole invention, he should not receive the priority that
he would have received had he solely invented the improvement.
Does the term "same inventor" have a different meaning for inter-
ference purposes than for conversion purposes as defined in
Schmidt? Is the interpretation of "error" really to mean "error at
the time of application"? It would seem that the statute should be
as liberally applied in interference practice as it is elsewhere."0 8
Other interference cases have been more liberal in their inter-
pretation of "error" and "same inventor." In Johnson & Johnson v.
C. B. Stenvall, Inc.,"°9 the district court was quick to hold that a sole
inventor who had filed a continuation-in-part of a joint application
was entitled to the earlier filing date."' In another case.' the exam-
iner accorded joint applicants, who had converted from a sole appli-
cation, the status of a division of the sole application."' Thus, it
seems that under certain fact situations the courts are following the
liberal trend. This, however, only makes the Lyon decision more
difficult to reconcile."1
Notwithstanding their present liberal trend, the courts have re-
quired a certain degree of diligence when applying for a conversion.
In Van Otteren v. Hafner,"4 A. B, and C worked together on a
project which culminated in an invention. On the same day, A filed
a sole application and B and C filed a joint one. An interference
was set up with the burden of proof being equal, no party having a
priority date. During the testimony, A and B decided that together
107 169 F.2d 808 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
108 See text accompanying notes 74-85 supra.
109 193 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
110 Id. at 131.
111 Moler v. Purdy, 131 U.S.P.Q. 276 (Pat. Off. Bd. Int. 1960).
112 d. at 281-83.
113 It is possible that the Board in Lyon may have tacitly applied the "late claiming"
doctrine discussed in Gardner, Late Claiming, 9 IDEA 321 (1965).
114 278 F.2d 738 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
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they were the true joint inventors of the invention. The court said
that the liberal rules of conversion would have applied except that A
and B failed to act with due diligence in applying for the conversion.
It was argued, but to no avail, that the delay was justified because
A and B were trying to determine whether C should have also been
joined. But the court found it unusual that there could be joint in-
vention without the parties knowing it."5
Inventorship plays too significant a role in interference proceed-
ings to permit inconsistent or illogical rulings to jeopardize the ap-
plicant's patent rights. Unfortunately, well-reasoned cases in this
area, like Van Otteren, are rare. Logic and the need for consistency
dictate that the same inventorship rules should apply to all interfer-
ence proceedings, whether they involve continuations, continuations-
in-part, divisions, or mere conversions.
C. Double Patenting
Double patenting is a judicial doctrine which simply prohibits
the same inventor from obtaining two patents on one invention.1 '
As the Supreme Court ruled, one invention can support only one
patent."1 The basic reasons for prohibiting double patenting are
two: (1) two patents on one invention could extend the monop-
oly, and (2) infringers could be exposed to a double harassment." 8
The doctrine of inventorship is an important factor in the area
of double patenting, for in order to determine if double patenting
exists, the Patent Office must first determine if the inventions are by
the same inventor. If they are not, then the institution of an inter-
ference proceeding is proper rather than a rejection for double
patenting. If the inventors are the same, or if there is a common
assignee of different inventors," 9 a rejection for double patenting
may be proper.
The Patent Act of 1952 has somewhat lessened the number of
rejections due to double patenting. Now the common inventor is
115 Id. at 740.
116 See generally Palmer, Double Patenting and Patent Soliciting, 41 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC Y 458 (1959); Rosenberg, Double Patenting: The Remedies of the Patent Act of
1952 and Beyond, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 34 (1963).
117 See Miller v. Eagle Affg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1894).
118 Palmer, Double Patenting, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND
INvE=ON MANAGEMENT 209, 212 (Calvert ed. 1964).
119 See, e.g., Application of Ward, 236 F.2d 428 (C.C.P.A. 1956); Application of
Borcherdt, 197 F.2d 550 (C.C.P.A. 1952). Contra, University of Ill. Foundation v.
Block Drug Co., 133 F. Supp. 580, 588 (E.D. IL 1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 US. 922 (1957).
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allowed to file what is known as a terminal disclaimer"2 whereby
he disclaims any extension of a monopoly over the 17-year period.
While at first the courts were hesitant to allow such a disclaimer to
overcome a double patenting rejection,12' the modern trend seems
to permit the common inventor to do so where this is the only ob-
jection on the record and where there is more than a mere colorable
variation in the same idea.'22
For the purposes of double patenting, the inventorship entity of
A is considered different than that of A and B.' While this is not
totally consistent with the judicial interpretation of the term "same
inventor" in the area of conversion of inventorships, it is not at all
unjustified, for the doctrine of double patenting stems from the fact
that one person or entity is trying to get two patents on one inven-
tion. Thus, since A and B, as joint inventors, cannot be the basis of
a double patenting rejection against either one individually, it would
seem that A, being different than A and B, could be the basis of a
novelty reference against A and B under section 102.124 But at least
one case' 25 has said that A is "not another" to A and B for section
102 purposes. Again it seems that one goes to court not knowing
where he stands.
The confusion which plagues the courts is best demonstrated by
the case of Application of Hession."2 ' There, two sole applications
for the same invention had been submitted to the Patent Office, one
by the inventor A, and the other by his supervisor B. Both applica-
tions were assigned to the same corporation. The corporation thus
had to decide which application it would honor. Accordingly, it
chose B's application upon which a patent was eventually issued.
Later it recognized its error and renounced B's invention, giving
credit to A, the true inventor. In order to avoid double patenting,
A filed a terminal disclaimer so as not to extend the monopoly be-
yond the time when the now invalid patent to B would have expired.
But even though B officially admitted that A was the true inventor,
120 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1964).
121 Application of Siu, 222 F.2d 267 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
-122Application of Kaye, 332 F.2d 816 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Application of Robeson,
331 F.2d 610 (CC.P.A. 1964).
12.3 E.g., Peelers Co. v. Kaakinen, 126 U.S.P.Q. 42 (W.D. Wash. 1960), aff'd, 301
F.2d 170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Ex parte Panagrossi, 126
U.S.P.Q. 287 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1960); Ex parte Lindeman, 107 U.S.P.Q. 331 (Pat.
Off. Bd. App. 1955).
124 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964), quoted at note 12 supra.
125 Application of Blout, 333 F.2d 928 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
126 296 F.2d 930 (C.CP.A. 1961).
1362
DOCTRINE OF INVENTORSHIP
the court held that the corporation was estopped to change its mind
due to its original election." It thus appears that not only must the
common assignee make an election in such situations, but also he
must be certain that his election is correct. 2
Probably the better reasoned opinion in Hession is the dissent by
Judge Rich 2.who thought the election was made through innocent
error. A hint of sarcasm can be noted by his comments on the ma-
jority's logic: "So, the logic is that elections are binding because
elections are binding, or, otherwise stated, the fundamental proposi-
tion supporting the doctrine of election is the doctrine of elec-
tion."'80  While this dissent is not the law today, it is well
documented and certainly contains much logical thinking.
Most unpredictability that exists today in the area of double pat-
enting can be attributed to the uncertain concept of inventorship. It
is evident that the "research team" approach employed by corpora-
tions will continually add to the complexities confronting the courts.
Stable inventorship policies would ease these problems and aid the
courts in attaining a workable solution.
D. Antitrust Law
(1) Fraud on the Patent Office.-Fraud on the Patent Of-
fice, like other fraud, consists of (1) misrepresentation of a material
fact; (2) knowledge of that fact's falsity; and (3) inducement to act
by another party.'' Thus a person who knowingly and falsely
swears that he is the true inventor can be found guilty of such fraud
and any patent thus wrongfully issued to him can be invalidated.'82
While the courts at times have been reluctant to declare a patent
invalid on such grounds,'38 many patents have been struck down for
various fraudulent acts. 8 Although it has been held that only the
12fId, at 934-35.
12 BAt least one authority has suggested that this is a harsh result. See Rosenberg,
supra note 116, at 60.
129 Application of Hession, 296 F.2d 930, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (dissenting opin-
ion).
13 0 1d. at 951.
'
3 1 Durham, Fraud in Patent Matters, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRAC-
TICE AND INVENTION MANAGMENT 336 (Calvert ed. 1964). See United States v.
Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp. 127, 140 (N.D. Ohio 1945), aff'd, 164 F.2d 754
(6th Cir. 1947).
132 See, e.g., United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
133 Edward Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 286 F.2d 933, 947 (5th Cir.),
modified o rehearing, 289 F.2d 355, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961).
184 E.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (false
showing of general industry acceptance); Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434 (1871)
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government can initiate actions to invalidate fraudulently obtained
patents,"3 5 a party with a real and substantial interest in the contro-
versy can attempt to prove fraud.'36 However, fraud is most often
alleged as a defense to an infringement action.'
A defendant, relying on fraud, must show the following factors:
(1) intent; (2) knowledge; and (3) materiality. 38 In order to show
fraudulent intent, it must be shown that the statement was made in
bad faith.3 9 To meet the knowledge test, the applicant must "know
that his conduct or statements are false or misleading."'40  There
appears to be no real test for materiality since no case has squarely
considered the issue. However, it would seem that if one were sued
for infringement, and he could prove that the patentee knowingly
intended to defraud the Patent Office by swearing he was the true
inventor, he could have the patent invalidated, because this would be
the misrepresentation of a material fact which goes to the heart of
all patent law.
(2) Antitrust Implications.-In the recent Supreme Court
case of Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
41
it was held that anyone who knowingly enforces a patent which has
been obtained by defrauding the Patent Office may be liable for
treble damages under antitrust law.'42  While the fraud in Walker
did not directly involve inventorship problems, there should be no
doubt that a similar holding would result no matter what type of
fraud was practiced.
(filing of false affidavits); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979 (D.
Del. 1947) (false showing of commercial success).
'35 United States v. Gunning, 18 Fed. 511, 512 (S.D. N.Y. 1883).
13 6 A. B. Dick Co. v. Mart, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878
(1952). Here, however, the party asserting the fraud could not prove his real and
substantial interest, the question being moot. "A party's minor role as protector of
the public interest in these cases does not seem to us enough to prevent this case from
being moot." Id. at 503.
137 See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
138 Cullen & Vickers, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 29 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 110, 126-29 (1960). See particularly cases cited therein: Floridin Co. v. At-
tapulgus Clay Co., 35 F. Supp. 810 (D. Del. 1940), affd, 125 F.2d 669 (3d Cir.
1942) (intent); Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 168 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. IMI. 1958),
modified, 274 F.2d 143 (7th Cit. 1960) (knowledge); Martin v. Ford Alexander
Corp., 160 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (materiality).
139 United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ohio 1945),
aff'd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1947).
140 Cullen & Vickers, supra note 138, at 128.
141382 U.S. 172 (1965).
142 Id. at 174. The applicable antitrust laws are Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 26
Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); Clayton Act § 4, 38 Star. 731 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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In Walker, the plaintiff filed suit for patent infringement. The
defendant denied the infringement and counterclaimed for a declara-
tory judgment that the patent was invalid. The plaintiff subse-
quently moved to dismiss with prejudice. Defendant then amended
its counterclaim charging that the plaintiff had "illegally monopo-
lized interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad
faith obtaining and maintaining. .,. its patent.., well knowing that
it had no basis for... a patent."143 By holding for the defendant,
the Court laid the framework for similar actions in the future. And
it appears very justifiable to hold answerable to the antitrust-monop-
oly provisions of the law one who secures a patent illegally and en-
forces it for a number of years.
It remains to be seen whether anyone will ever have to answer
to an antitrust counterclaim by reason of maintaining the wrong in-
ventorship entity. But it seems, in view of the increasing number of
complications arising in the area, that this will be the next step. It
would be a high price to pay for a corporation which knowingly, but
for some insignificant reason, did not let the true inventor apply for
a patent.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that the doctrine of inventorship plays a
fundamental role in the prosecution and enforcement of a valid
patent. The forces which continually come into conflict are the
statutory requirement that the true inventor must apply and the
modern trend toward corporate "research-team" inventorship enti-
ties. To reconcile the two, a plausible solution would be for the
statute to allow the patent to issue to the corporation, 44 that is, if it
would have been assigned to it anyway. This system would protect
the corporation from the loss of a patent on technical grounds, and
would resolve many of the inconsistencies in the interpretation of
such phrases as the "same inventor." On the other hand, the in-
ventor who might suffer an intellectual loss (since he would no
longer be recognized on the patent) could be compensated by the
143 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1965).
144 This practice is followed with apparent success in Great Britain and other for-
eign countries. The Patent Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, 5 1. For a commentary
on the law see VOJACEK, A SURVEY OF THE PRiNcIPAL NATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS
§ 2 (1936). While it could be said that such a system would violate the Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, it is submitted that one could interpret "Inventors" as used in
the Constitution to indude corporations. Corporations are considered "persons" for
many other purposes; is there a justification for not doing so here?
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corporation with financial increases and other superficial recogni-
tion. For instance, with the proper statutory authority, the Patent
Office could require the corporation to issue certificates of inventor-
ship to the deserving employer. This system seems less cumbersome
and more logical than the "more-the-safer" practice of the modern
corporation. That system of applying in the name of all the re-
searchers or anyone who had a part in the invention is certainly
inconsistent with the statutory mandate that only the true inventor
can apply. And while this system is dangerous, it is suggested that
it is far safer than the practice which some corporations employ,
that is, to name the president of the corporation as the inventor.
Finally, it is suggested that due to the recent liberalization of the
inventorship conversion statutes, the courts should consider the sole-
to-sole inventorship conversion. While there are some valid coun-
ter arguments to this suggestion, it seems that if the wrong inventor
applies through innocent error the change should be allowed.
While the statute is silent now, the statute was also silent in 1920
when In re Roberts'45 set out the judicia background for present-day
statutory conversions.
Many of these questions and more are currently being consid-
ered by the President's Commission on the Patent System. 46 It is
hoped that some modernization and consistency in the laws which
make up the doctrine of inventorship will result from the Commis-
sion's endeavors.
EDWARD G. GREIVE
145 263 Fed. 646 (D.C. Cir. 1920). See text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
14 6 The Commission was formed by Exec. Order No. 11215, 30 Fed. Reg. 4661
(1965). For a report of the initial meeting of the Commission see 1965 AMERcAN
PATENT L. A. BULL. 577.
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